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Introduction
In the early morning of March 3, 2003, two young women, Yao Dan and Xiao
Yu, were sitting in a Beijing hotel room when 20 officers of the Chinese Public Security
Bureau burst in and detained them. Their crime? They were in Beijing to attempt to
meet with the defense lawyer representing Xiao Yu’s father, Xiao Yunliang. Xiao
Yunliang had been tried several weeks earlier along with Yao Dan’s father, Yao Fuxin,
for allegedly “subverting the political power of the [Chinese] state.” Both men were
arrested in connection with their participation in a labor protest that had occurred a year
earlier in the industrial town of Liaoyang in northeast China.1 But that was not the reason
given to the women for their detention, according to the independent and widely
respected China Labour Bulletin of Hong Kong. They were told, absurdly, that the hotel
they were staying in was “too shabby,” and that they would be taken to another hotel and
allowed to meet with Xiao’s lawyer. Instead they were taken to yet another location in
the city where they were held while their possessions were searched. They were then
driven back to Liaoyang in a police van accompanied by eight police officers, held
separately in a government office and questioned for several hours. Before their release,
the police requested they sign a doctored transcript of the interrogation including a
statement that the purpose of their visit to Beijing had been, “to talk to foreign news
media.” Three months later the Intermediate People’s Court of Liaoyang Municipality
duly announced that the fathers of both women had been convicted of their “crime” and
sentenced them to four years in prison and an additional two-year period during their
“political rights” are to be suspended.2
As it turned out, the women were probably mostly guilty of bad timing. Their
visit to Beijing happened to come just before the opening of the Chinese National
People’s Congress and the National People’s Political Consultative Conference that were
both engaged in sensitive discussions and negotiations about the transfer of power to a
new generation of Chinese leaders.3 But why would that cause the police to be so
concerned about the attempt of these women to meet with the lawyer representing one of
their fathers? Was Beijing attempting to send a signal about the right of counsel in the
new China? No. It appears far more likely that this event signals the fear and sense of
fragility that grips the Chinese leadership. The fathers of these two women had been
active in one of the most important worker protests among many thousands of such
protests that have swept through China in the last few years. When originally arrested the
two men were threatened with the death penalty. Only an international campaign of
solidarity and further protest by fellow workers succeeded in getting the Chinese regime
1

Criminal Verdict, Intermediate People’s Court of Liaoyang Municipality, Liaoning
Province (Translated and published by China Labour Bulletin, June 26, 2003).
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Descriptions of these events are found in Press Release, Human Rights in China,
Liaoyang Labor Activists’ Daughters Detained, March 3, 2003 and China Labour
Bulletin, The Liaoyang Workers’ Struggle: Portrait of a Movement, July, 2003 at 26.
The conviction and sentence is found in Intermediate People’s Court supra note 1.
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to reduce the sentence. The convictions of these worker activists for engaging in what
much of the rest of the world would consider mild social protest, together with the
harassment of their families for attempting to engage legal counsel, highlight the true
state of labor relations and of the law in modern China.
Unfortunately this is no longer a phenomenon that can be viewed from a distance.
China is now, and increasingly, an integral player in the global economy and in
international relations. The detention and harassment of Yao Dan and Xiao Yu indicate
what is at stake: economic and political restructuring in China today is affecting the lives
of millions, yet only a small number of top bureaucrats and wealthy regime-backed
entrepreneurs are making the basic decisions about the outcome of this process. This
bureaucratic and entrepreneurial class resists fiercely any serious attempt to build
independent and democratic institutions such as trade unions. If this means exposing the
regime as hypocritical about its commitment to the rule of law in China, they seem
willing to take the political heat. The globalization process that has done so much to
integrate the Chinese economy into the world economy has only encouraged the regime.
Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, European and American corporations are fighting tooth
and nail to take advantage of the changes underway in China. They see China as offering
the world a vast pool of relatively cheap labor that comes not a moment too soon as
declining profitability has hit returns to investors in the advanced economies. According
to official government statistics, China’s urban population has more than quadrupled
since the early 1950s, whereas its rural population has only increased from 503 to 866
million..4 This massive population shift is contributing to a significant unemployment
problem. And that, in turn, is the cause of widespread social unrest. The Chinese
Communist regime views this unrest as subversive of their entrenched power. Thus
rather than being concerned that the violation of universally recognized civil liberties
such as the right of access to legal counsel and the freedom of association are the source
of increased tension with the outside world, the regime views these violations as the
solution to a significant problem facing the global economy. If not confronted with an
alternative path of economic and political development the integration of China into the
global economy risks the achievements of more than a century of effort by the
international labor movement to establish basic human rights as an inviolable floor
beneath which the world could not sink.
The emerging Chinese model – a “socialist market economy” according to the
regime itself – represents a new stage in the evolution of post Cold War global
capitalism. The core principle of this model is the so-called “race to the bottom” where
global multinational corporations ally with repressive developing country governments to
combine high productivity manufacturing and services with cheap labor at the expense of
unionized workers in developed economies. Free market advocates typically attempt to
reduce the idea of a “race to the bottom” in global labor conditions to a caricature. If
there really were a race to the bottom, they ask, then why are there so few multinationals
operating in central Africa or countries like Haiti, where wages are indeed the lowest in
the world? It is certainly true that capital is reluctant to invest in countries like Haiti or
4

China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, 1998 (p.105).
3

Rwanda, though such countries have long been the source of vital natural resources and
agricultural products for global multinationals. It is also true that an examination of cross
border trade and investment flows demonstrates that the vast majority of such flows are
between developed economies not between the developed and developing world.5 But
that misstates the problem. The “race to the bottom” defines a different and new issue:
the ability of sophisticated multinational corporate capital to combine high productivity
technology with labor that is paid substantially less than that found in the developed
world. Developing this dynamic is not as simple as finding the worst paid and most
repressed workers in the world. What one finds, in fact, in countries like Haiti or
Rwanda are not workers in the classic sense – ready and available to be part of the
disciplined structure of a modern capitalist firm. In large part the populations of those
countries are at a near feudal level of development, with the “workforce” resembling
peasants not modern workers. The difference in China or Mexico or Indonesia is that
decades of rule there by modernizing authoritarian states has produced a new kind of
workforce that is akin to that found in Europe or the United States, but at a wage level far
below that of the advanced economies and without the independent political power that
characterizes countries with strong labor movements.
The “race to the bottom” is, in fact, what Harley Shaiken calls “high productivity
poverty.” This “isn’t the poverty of Haiti or Bangladesh,” Shaiken argues, “where
industry is antiquated and the societies and people are poor…. The problem isn’t
developing countries attracting advanced manufacturing, but rather that wages aren’t
simply low, they are artificially depressed. The law or the club – or both – are used to
prevent workers from sharing the gains…. [T] he historic link between workers
producing more and earning more is tragically reversed – workers produce more and earn
less.”6 Financial analyst Richard Duncan confirms this trend:
Almost any labor-intensive product that can be made in the United States,
Western Europe or Japan can be made at considerably less cost in China
or a dozen other low-wage nations. Impediments once thrown up by
transportation problems or capital shortages have long since been
overcome by technological developments and the removal of capital
controls. Today, the most capital-intensive manufacturing processes can
be financed and built in any number of developing countries, so that the
most advanced facilities can be combined with the lowest-cost labor.7
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See Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International
Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (1999).
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Nancy Montwieler, ‘High Productivity Poverty’ Threatens Workers Labor, Professor
Warns Machinists Meeting, Daily Labor Report, Sep. 13, 2000 at C-1. See also, Harley
Shaiken, Mexico in the Global Economy: High Technology and Work Organization in
Export Industries (1990).
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This break in the link between productivity and wages is the key to understanding the
phenomenon known widely as the “race to the bottom.” The creation of that link was the
result of decades of effort by the international trade union movement. In the late 1920’s
and 1930’s it led economists to speak of a new development: wage rigidity. This was the
reflection in economic theory of the power of trade unions and led Keynes to conclude
that the normal process of wages falling to a market-clearing price, often referred to as
“Say’s Law” as Keynes understood it, no longer functioned.8
Today, the entrance of China into the world economy signals the return of Say’s
Law, a world where the “artificial” constraints on markets such as those represented by
effective labor rights are dissolved. As one leading Wall Street economist told his
clients:
China’s labor force is bigger than that in all of the OECD countries
combined. Its rapid development has caused dramatic shifts in relative
factor prices in a short period of time. Some of the changes will be
permanent even with China’s maturity. The most important one is that the
value of labor will be permanently devalued against scarce resources.
This is likely to have far-reaching consequences to the distribution of
income in the world. The speed comes from the fact that the labor
productivity gap between China and the mature economies is far less than
the wealth gap between them…..China’s reintegration into the global
economy, therefore, presents a major discontinuity. The gaps between
China and developed economies for productivity and for wealth are
8

John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1964)
at 26. There is enormous controversy within the field of economic history on the actual
definition of Say’s Law and on Keynes’ interpretation of it. In fact, the Law itself is
better understood as the “law of markets”- which holds that where there is no
“interference” with the markets they will find an equilibrium whereby all output can be
sold. Only what W.H. Hutt called “defects in pricing” can interfere with the exchange of
all output for other goods and services. W.H. Hutt, A Rehabilitation of Say’s Law (1974)
at 8. But there is very little controversy about what Keynes meant on a substantive level,
that the power of the labor movement constrained the ability of the private sector and the
government to use wage cutting as a means of jumpstarting economic growth in a
depression. “To suppose that a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a
system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. It is only
in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be
decreed that a flexible wage-policy could function with success. One can imagine it in
operation in Italy, Germany or Russia, but not in France, the United States or Great
Britain.” Keynes (1936) at 269. Recall, of course, that this was when fascism or
Stalinism ruled the first set of states, while democracy continued to function in the latter
set. Hutt expressed the more traditional laissez-faire view that the power of unions was a
key “defect in pricing” rather than the inevitable by product of modern capitalism. Hutt
(1974) at 134-144. On Say generally, see Evelyn L. Forget, The Social Economics of
Jean-Baptiste Say: Markets and virtue (1999).
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expressing themselves through rapid capital reallocation from mature
economies to China and the consequent rapid growth of China’s exports.
The key driver is China’s low wages resulting from its vast surplus labor
and low level of wealth.9
Far from being an anomaly, then, the arrest and conviction of Chinese labor
activists, the harassment of their families for attempting to meet with legal counsel, and
the violent suppression of democratic institutions such as free trade unions and
independent political parties, represent a stark, if not dark, future for the global system.
In fact, the effort to move the world in this direction has been given significant support
by attempts to change the basic structure and purpose of central international institutions
such as the International Labor Organization and the World Trade Organization. Such a
conclusion runs counter to the arguments made about the nature of political and
economic reform in China today. For the most part, supporters of the Chinese
restructuring process argue that the market reforms underway there today will naturally
create an opening for political pluralism and, eventually, a genuine rule of law and
democratization.10 This viewpoint is reflected inside the international labor movement
itself by those who argue that the trade union movement should begin a process of
“constructive engagement” with the government controlled All China Federation of
Trade Unions (“ACFTU”).11 Both the general view that China will evolve towards
democracy and the specific subset of this view that the ACFTU itself will begin to, or
already does, behave like a genuine trade union thus reinforcing the democratization
process, in fact, represent an intellectual and political collapse or retreat that is
representative as much of the problems of non-Chinese capitalist societies as it reflective
of a genuine understanding of what is really happening in China today.
This article will take its lead from the actions of the Chinese regime itself. The
regime’s fear that the mere presence of two young women in Beijing trying to meet with
a lawyer representing their labor activist fathers suggests that there are two major issues
of concern to the Chinese regime: law and labor. Thus, at the level of law, the focus will
be on the changes that have taken place in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and
the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) that are reinforcing the emerging Chinese
model. China entered the WTO last year after a bitter political battle between the
American trade union movement, on the one hand, and nearly the entire U.S. political and
business establishment, on the other, cleared the way in the spring of 2000. But this
9

Andy Xie, Asia Pacific: The Chinese Decade, Global Economic Forum, Morgan
Stanley, Feb. 10, 2003.
10

Henry M. Paulson, Jr., More Than the Bloom of One I.P.O., The New York Times,
April 15, 2000 at 17.
11

Kent Wong and Elaine Bernard, Labor’s Mistaken Anti-China Campaign, New Labor
Forum, Fall/Winter 2000 (“Labor needs to encourage critical engagement with
China….[L]abor leaders should take a bold step and seek to open up dialogue and
cultivate relationships with workers and trade unions in China.”)

6

could only be accomplished by the codification of a certain new approach to international
labor rights in both the WTO and the ILO. This article will argue that this new approach
has actually created a legal pathology that only postpones resolution of the real problems
associated with the China model. It is an unstable compromise that conflicts with other
principles at work in the international legal environment.12
These international legal developments are being met domestically within China
by an attempt to impose a new regime on the Chinese working class. This new regime
relies on the same heavy-handed authoritarian measures that have long been constituent
elements of modern Chinese politics. In the past the Chinese Communists justified such
measures by the alleged need to resist the encroachment of capitalism, while now the
Party defends the same authoritarian approach as necessary to succeed in the capitalist
world. These developments feed each other. As accommodations are made to
undemocratic approaches to human rights in international institutions, those elements in
countries like China that see a shortcut to wealth and power through authoritarianism are
encouraged to continue to suppress democratic movements. There is, as well, an
unhealthy feedback into the advanced economies as the “race to the bottom” undermines
the ability of those economies to afford better wages, hours and working conditions in
industries that compete with Chinese authoritarianism. Thus, the international labor
movement may have the most to lose among an array of democratic institutions. The
entry of China into the global economy signals the arrival of nearly a billion workers into
the global labor market. Even commentators reluctant to embrace the idea of a “race to
the bottom” in the global market pause when they consider the overwhelming impact of
China.13 An example from just one industrial sector, textile, clothing and footwear,
illustrates the problem. While throughout the 1990’s the number of people working in
this industry remained stable at 30 million, Cynthia Williams has noted, “there has been a
dramatic shift in the distribution of those jobs towards Asia,” with that region now
accounting for 72% of world employment in the sector and China alone 20%.
12

For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[hereinafter ICESCR], pt. III, art. 8(1)(a), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) recognizes the right of individuals “to form
trade unions and join the trade union of his choice…[and] the right to strike.” See Aaron
N. Lehl, China’s Trade Union System Under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Is China in Compliance with Article 8?, 21 Hawaii L. Rev.
203, 226 (1999). The ICESCR is, in some ways, stronger than the ILO Declaration as it
not only incorporates the crucial principle of freedom of choice of labor organizations but
also recognizes the right to strike.
13

William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for
International Labor Standards, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 715 (2001) (“there is no evidence of a
‘race to the bottom’ internationally in the labor arena” but “there are substantial
arguments for international regulation” because “the outlier countries coupled with China
make it possible that the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon could yet become a pressing
one”).
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Meanwhile, employment in Europe and the United States in that sector “fell steadily
throughout 1990-1998. She references an ILO study that notes that the average hourly
wage rate in the industry range from a high of $10 an hour in Europe to a low of $0.45 an
hour in China.14
But if labor loses so does democracy. The trade union is a central force for
democratization, transparency and social responsibility in a modern industrial economy.
Without the ability to form effective trade unions, workers cannot be said to enjoy
fundamental human rights such as the freedom of association or the freedom of speech or
the right to have grievances heard and redressed. Without an effective labor movement
there is no counterweight to the power of business interests or volatile market forces in
society or to the state itself. The power of the market to force new forms of brutal
competition can easily take hold generating deep political conflict and social unrest.
Equally possible is the emergence of a Leviathan state that suppresses human freedom.
In fact, as this article should demonstrate, this is precisely why exploring the process of
economic reform in China is so valuable. The economic changes underway there are
creating huge new inequities and imbalances. This is now leaking into the international
arena as China’s cheap labor export led model of growth has generated a massive trade
imbalance between China and the United States. As the presidential elections approach
this is becoming an increasingly important problem in domestic U.S. politics. Thus, this
article will argue, there is a need to articulate an alternative model that restores the role of
democratic institutions as a counterweight to Say’s “law of markets.”
To explore these issues, this article will consider four areas of concern. First, the
structural changes underway in the Chinese economy are creating both domestic and
international imbalances that are exacerbating inequalities among Chinese workers and
creating new inequities in the global labor market. Second, the Chinese regime’s
approach to labor rights remains rigidly authoritarian and so is triggering ever more
dramatic confrontations between workers and the Chinese state, despite the regime’s
nominal commitment to “socialism.” Third, these developments are being reinforced by
a pathological evolution in the principles that govern key international institutions such as
the WTO and the ILO. A conflict has emerged within the international legal arena
between the founding principles of these institutions and their current approach to labor
and human rights issues. Fourth, within the international labor movement itself a small
current is emerging which views an accommodation with the Chinese regime a feasible
alternative to the long-standing goal of the international labor movement of independent
and free trade unionism in China. This approach threatens the credibility of the labor
movement’s opposition to the most damaging aspects of the globalization process, a
major commitment of the international labor movement since the “battle of Seattle” that
took place at the failed ministerial conference of the WTO in November 1999.
14

Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 705, 731 (2002), citing Press Release, ILO, Global
Employment Levels in Textile, Clothing and Footwear Industries Holding Stable as
Industries Relocate (Oct. 16, 2000) available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/38.htm.
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These four developments militate in favor of the need to reassert core principles
of labor solidarity but these must not just be mindlessly repeated. These developments
signal a new form of global capitalism that increasingly sees authoritarianism as having a
natural role in a modern economy. The unquestioned acceptance of the outcomes of the
“law of markets,” no matter how volatile, uneven, or unjust, now appears as the norm as
social movements and democratic institutions are rendered a nearly mute Greek chorus.
Thus critics must take into account the new forms of capitalism and the power of its
norms as it devises alternatives. Restoring the validity of questioning outcomes and thus
of the value of social input and control of those outcomes must lie at the heart of these
alternatives. This means that support, for example, of labor rights in China must go
beyond the typical anti-Stalinist rhetoric that labor has used in the past. The Chinese
regime may fear the emergence of a Polish Solidarity style movement. But the labor
movement must also learn from the mistakes and limits of the Solidarity experience.
China’s Economy at a Turning Point
It is hard to overstate the magnitude of the changes underway in China today.
While still only accounting for 5% of global manufactured exports in 2002, according to
Morgan Stanley chief economist Stephen Roach, China nonetheless accounted for 29% of
that year’s growth in that sector.15 This remarkable development is the result of twenty
years of economic policy change in China. In the early eighties, the regime partially
freed up prices in the agricultural sector and allowed farmers to retain a portion of their
profits. This, in turn, unleashed pent-up demand for consumer goods, and so the regime
went one step further, endorsing the new light industry and consumer goods businesses
that began to emerge in the rural townships and villages. What one observer called an
"extraordinarily virtuous economic circle" emerged whereby higher prices for food
stimulated demand for basic consumer products like bicycles, televisions, and
refrigerators and, increasingly, for light industrial goods such as tractors.16 This process
sustained growth rates averaging 9 percent for most of the 1980s.17 Non-farm
employment tripled from thirty million to ninety-three million people in that decade
alone, with some sixteen million new rural businesses established.18
These new entities are seen by western Sinophiles as evidence of the emergence
of a new private entrepreneurial class in China allowing the country, in the words of

15

Stephen Roach, Global: China -- Externally or Internally Driven?, Morgan Stanley
Global Economic Forum, April 2, 2003.
16

Joe Studwell, The China Dream: The Quest for the Last Great Untapped Market on
Earth (2002) at 34.
17

Id. at 38.

18

Id. at 34.
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mainstream economist Barry Naughton, to “grow out of the Plan.”19 But many of these
new firms were formed with local state and party official endorsement and participation.
They have become a new competing power center in Chinese society, absorbing scarce
financial resources. They are also the source of huge new income inequalities. Although
the country has indeed registered huge gains in national income during the last twenty
years, the gains have not been equally reflected in the personal income of ordinary
Chinese households. In an articulate and thorough study Inequality and Poverty in
China, economists Azizur Khan and Carl Riskin take careful aim at the impact of market
reforms and find the results disturbing.20 Communist Party reformer Deng Xiaoping had
declared “let some get rich first” and the lucky few have done so with a vengeance.
While the country has indeed registered huge gains in national income during the last
twenty years, this has not been equally reflected in the personal income actually received
by ordinary Chinese households. Khan and Riskin note that "between 1988 and 1995
inequality in the distribution of income in China increased sharply [as] China [became]
one of the more unequal of the Asian developing countries." Thus, despite the
impressive macro level gains of the 1980s, as the 1990s unfolded there was, this study
concluded, "an unusually rapid widening of income inequality . . . a much retarded rate of
poverty reduction in the countryside . . . and a significant increase in absolute poverty in
the towns and cities." In rural China the TVE’s have actually worsened income
inequality as the enterprises offer higher wages but to only a small portion of the newly
available workforce of former peasants, most of whom are forced to survive at or below
the poverty line on whatever their backyard plots of land can produce.
Nonetheless, despite its apparent growth, the new so-called private sector does not
have anywhere near the resources to take on the huge industrial needs of Chinese society.
The single largest fully private entity in China has annual revenues of $600 million, half
the turnover of the 1000th company on the Fortune 1000 list. Even today this sector
contributes only one-eighth of the nation’s gross domestic product and employs less than
twenty million workers in a nation of 1.2 billion people. In any case, the apparent
economic miracle began to slow precipitously after the initial boost in the 1980s. In the
early 1990s, it was discovered that the TVE’s “had overstated production by more than
40%” wiping out $100 billion from the country’s national income accounts.21 Much of
the actual gain in GNP has been created by the regime’s continued reliance on heavy
capital investment thus only exacerbating inequality and poverty. Khan and Riskin
identify what is called “investment hunger,” especially among local governments that are
now less constrained by Beijing as the early stages of the reform process loosened the
19

Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993
(1995); John McMilland and Christopher Woodruff, The Central Role of Entrepreneurs
in Economic Reform (2002) (unpubl. paper in possession of author); John McMillan,
China’s Nonconformist Reforms (1994) (unpubl. paper in possession of author).
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Studwell supra note __ at 231-232.
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grip of national power.22 “The state allowed an expansion of credit to pump up
accumulation and drive a wedge between growth of GDP and that of personal income.”23
Despite the pace of reform, China’s state-owned enterprises, or SOE’s, still
control the "commanding heights" of the economy in industries like steel, oil, and
automobile assembly. In contrast to the still tiny private sector, together China’s two
state-owned oil companies have revenues of more than eighty billion dollars and are
comfortably placed on the Fortune Asia 25 list. In this sector, one finds that instead of
the massive privatization that took place in the former Soviet Union with such disastrous
effect, the regime has tried only partial privatizations, while continuing to feed these
enterprises massive amounts of credit, recycling the savings of China's billion people into
outdated and poor-performing industrial behemoths. China, in fact, actually seems
committed more than ever to state control of key economic sectors.24
Many of these enterprises are truly out of a different age – the age of Soviet
influenced heavy industry or the American variant, the massive auto complex at Ford’s
River Rouge. These plants were, like their Soviet, American or eastern European
counterparts, impressive achievements – fifty years ago. But on world terms today they
are bankrupt. The regime thus finds itself in a trap of its own making. Having created
this heavy industrial base, it has also created a massive industrial working class – or
rather its new post-revolution working class created this massive industrial base, through
the use of the most brutal forms of forced labor in the 50’s and 60’s.25 But to restructure
now in a fashion that would allow these companies to be globally competitive will
require huge layoffs and huge new capital investment. In the spring of 2000, for
example, the regime restructured its large state oil industry and attempted an initial public
offering of shares in the newly formed PetroChina to global investors, including a listing
on the New York Stock Exchange. To make the PetroChina IPO even barely credible to
global capital markets required the layoff of hundreds of thousands and a promise to push
billions in debts back to the state through PetroChina’s parent company, China National
Petroleum, which remained entirely in state hands.26
The only way that the regime believes it can preserve its own power in this
process is to keep “muddling through,” in Joe Studwell’s words. Thus, the regime allows
foreign companies to set up assembly plants in the special economic zones in coastal
22

Khan and Riskin supra note __ at 105.
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Id. at 151.
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Barry Naughton, Opening the Red Box: Explaining Economic Policy Regimes in
China, Walter Shorenstein Forum, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University,
Feb. 6, 2003.
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See Nigel Harris, The Mandate of Heaven: Marx and Mao in Modern China (1978).
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Stephen F. Diamond, The PetroChina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in the
Anti-Globalization Era, The Journal of Corporation Law, forthcoming, Fall, 2003.
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areas and, in the niches not already occupied by the state sector, encourages a limited
domestic private sector to evolve from below. But it cannot allow the resulting
inequalities and poverty this process causes to become so extreme that workers revolt.
The regime fears a social explosion, called by the Chinese “da luan” or total chaos, a
fear made real by the labor insurgency that took place in the spring of 2002 in the
oilfields run by PetroChina and in the industrial zone of Liaoyang.27 The pall of Hungary
in 1956 and Poland in 1980 continues to hang over the Chinese Communists.
Meanwhile, the regime continues feeding enough credit to the SOE’s to keep
them alive; conditioning the credit on hoped for restructuring, but not so much credit that
inflation is unleashed. Inflation has been a continuing problem causing the regime to
punctuate the growth of the last two decades with binges of harsh austerity. What many
in the west view as a struggle between hard and soft-liners, or between a “Maoist” left
and a “market socialist” right, is really a reflection of managing a business cycle with
“Chinese characteristics.” This is a risky business for the regime. The price controls of
the late 1980’s certainly tamed an inflation rate that reached 50% in 1988, but that
austerity was considered a key factor in triggering the 1989 social revolt centered in
Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.28 The protests received widespread popular support with
marches of a million workers or more in several major cities. The regime could only kill
the movement by relying on the brutal efficiency of crack troops from the People’s
Liberation Army. After that event controlling wages was much less of a problem for
several years.
Thus, “muddling through” may not be sufficient. The credit that sustains the
growth process must come from somewhere. The free trade zones on the Chinese coast
are fed by foreign direct investment. But the SOE’s and the domestic private sector rely
on the recycling of the huge savings of ordinary Chinese people. Since the banking
system is state owned and, in theory, the renminbi is not convertible into foreign
currencies, Chinese workers, peasants and small businesses are forced to finance the
continued capital accumulation drive of the Communist regime. The whole game
depends on the regime’s continuing top down control of that financial system. Thus,
promises of convertibility of the currency as early as 1993 are now put off well into the
future.29
Of course, if the renminbi were freely tradable on the world markets and if
ordinary Chinese savers could freely hold their savings in foreign banks or invest them in
the equities of European or American companies as their counterparts do in the west and
much of Asia, there would most likely be a massive “run on the bank” as the value of
27
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Chinese assets would be forced to come into line with global values. The pressure on
domestic values is so great that Studwell argues that even without convertibility or an
opening of the financial sector a bank run is still a possibility. “Everything comes down
to psychology…the psychology of the ordinary Chinese people,” he notes.30 From this
vantage point, events like the 1989 Tiananmen revolt take on new meaning. China may
be in the grips of an investment bubble that, once it bursts, will cause a social and
economic crisis that dwarfs that which afflicted most of Asia in the late 1990’s. In the
case of China, the “hot money” that sparked the Asian financial crisis is actually
represented by the domestic savings of ordinary Chinese, fueled by the bulging domestic
reserves linked to Chinese exports. A “flood of credit [in the 90s] allowed an overinvestment binge that caused the ratio of private investment to personal consumption to
peak at 83% in 1993 and to remain above 70% thereafter.”31 The regime’s credibility,
and therefore its power, depends on maintaining the credibility of its economic policy. It
is not just that the regime fears a Solidarity-like protest movement rising up in reaction to
political repression or unemployment, it also fears a tearing away of the veil that covers
up the country’s financial fragility. This could, in turn, cause the population to lose their
faith in the regime and, in turn, trigger a massive political upheaval.
What are the escape routes for the regime? A massive debt for equity swap is
one. Since the debts the state has piled using domestic savings must actually be repaid
and in the meantime must pay interest, they can get very expensive. The state owned
banks now hold massive amounts non-performing loans made to the SOE’s and the
TVE’s. And the government has, as well, huge under funded pension liabilities. When
these massive liabilities are added together, Studwell estimates a debt to equity ratio of
nearly 500 percent for the state sector – outstripping even South Korea on the verge of its
economic collapse in 1997.32 So by creating stock markets, the regime has tried to
encourage Chinese savers to invest instead in equity issued by these same state
companies. The regime even dreams of large mutual funds rescuing them from the
pension trap they face, hoping they can convince Chinese workers to trade the “iron” rice
bowl guarantees of an earlier era for the volatile world of publicly-traded equities. But
equity holders expect capital gains over time and hope that inside managers will pay out
regular dividends and neither is legally mandated. And in China, senior corporate
insiders, for the most part still members of the ruling Communist Party, have the
additional advantage that they need not fear the disciplinary effect of a potential takeover
by competitors or financial players since there is, as of yet, no competitive market for
corporate control in China. This shift to equity finance explains the stock market mania
that hit China in the 1990’s. The regime engaged, it appears, in a massive “pump and
dump” scheme touting share ownership in companies that by any stretch of the
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imagination are actually worthless. In the first half of 1992 the Shanghai stock market
index registered an unsustainable gain of 1200 per cent.33
A second strategy has been to turn to foreign stock markets, first in Hong Kong,
but more recently to the London and New York Stock Exchanges. There Chinese
companies have been notably less successful. The pump and dump has not fooled quite
as many investors. Where Chinese companies trade their stock both at home and on the
Hong Kong exchange, the shares sold in Hong Kong trade at a substantial discount, as
much as 85%, giving the outside world some idea of the discount factor that one might
have to apply to the entire Chinese economy if its assets were freely tradable.34 Finally,
the regime has encouraged the establishment of foreign investment in the so-called
Special Economic Zones. But even their explosive growth makes a relatively small dent
in this massive country. More importantly, their potential future growth is limited. Most
of these plants are only final assembly points in a global assembly line so that the value
added by Chinese workers is a small percentage of top line revenue. The sector shipped
$150 billion worth of goods in 2000, but less than 25% of that was value added in the
free trade areas in China.35 The state sector cannot compete yet in quality and reliability
with the foreign suppliers that feed parts into the assembly plants. In addition, the
companies are heavily dependent on the infrastructure provided by coastal proximity to
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Interestingly, as Khan and Riskin note, despite what free trade
theory might predict, the industrialization in this and the TVE sectors “so far…have been
quite employment-hostile” with a “drastic” decline in increases in employment even as
output spurted ahead.
The social and political effects of this process are equally striking. As a result of
this reform process there are estimates that as many as 20 million people a year are
leaving the rural areas of China for the cities in search of work.36 To put this in
perspective, a single year’s inflow of new urban workers in China is equivalent to the
entire manufacturing employment base of the United States. In fact, because of the
recent downturn in the U.S. economy some 2 million jobs have been lost and
manufacturing employment in the US has now dropped to a twenty year low of 16
million jobs. This has now made the U.S.-China trade balance a politically sensitive
issue inside the United States.37 China’s trade surplus with the United States is now the
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world’s largest, reaching $83 billion in 2001, while the balance with Mexico was in
surplus only to the tune of $30 billion.38 Even Japan, America’s most feared competitor
in the 1980’s had a surplus of only $69 billion that year.39 This has led to pressure by the
U.S. government on China to revalue its currency, currently pegged to the dollar at a rate
of roughly 8 to 1, thus making its exports relatively more expensive.40 Meanwhile, as
discussed below, domestically China is experiencing an unprecedented wave of worker
unrest. Thus, the reform process is creating internal and external imbalances that are
increasingly the stimulus for domestic social conflict and global tension.

Chinese Trade Unionism
A central feature of China’s approach to economic policy is to maintain tight
control over its workforce even as it opens up the economy. Thus the country’s policy
towards trade unionism is crucial to understanding the relationship of China to the world
economy today. As is widely accepted in political theory and history, trade unions
provide a counter-weight to the power of government and business interests in a modern
industrial society. The aggressive spread of neo-liberal policies through globalization has
undermined the ability of unions to play this role in the post Cold War world. But the
need for trade unions has only increased. The political impact of trade unions is widely
recognized. The effort to organize a union requires certain political liberties, such as free
speech, the right of assembly and the right to have grievances redressed. These broader
political liberties run parallel to core labor standards like the right to join the union of
your own choice and the rights to organize, to bargain, and, if necessary, to strike. A
country with a strong union movement is also likely, therefore, to be a country with a
vibrant democracy and respect for the rule of law.
These rights are still largely absent in China and this is reflected in the status of
the labor movement there. The official All China Federation of Trade Unions, or
ACFTU, is simply a creature of the Chinese state and the Communist Party. It is
obligated by its own rules and law to act as a transmission belt for party and state policy.
As labor unrest has spread across China in the last few years, the ACFTU has sat on the
sidelines, emerging on occasion only to condemn these rank and file efforts to secure
jobs, pensions and other basic economic benefits. This is a pattern that is all too familiar
to students of societies in transition from Stalinism to modern capitalism. There is little
hope that China will avoid this pattern. And thus the international labor movement has
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generally given its support to efforts to form genuine, independent unions in China as
part of the support for the development of the rule of law and respect for human rights.
Independent trade unions are outlawed in China.41 The ACFTU maintains what
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (“ICFTU”), the leading global
labor umbrella organization, calls a “trade union monopoly.”42 The right to strike does
not exist.43 An effort to establish a Workers Autonomous Federation, or WAF, as part of
the wider Democracy Movement of 1989 was met with particularly harsh repression.
Many affiliates of that Federation are still in prison or labor camps. Amnesty
International details numerous ongoing abuses of workers for their organizing and other
activity.44 Arrests and arbitrary detentions were made throughout 1999 as labor unrest
increased due to the worsening economic situation. Here are some of the examples they
report:
Li Qingxi, a laid-off worker from the Datong coalmine in Shanxi
province, was arrested in January when he posted publicly a statement
calling for independent trade unions. He was sentenced in March without
charge or trial to one year of “re-education through labor, reportedly to be
served “at home.” Zhang Shanuang, a labor rights activist from Hunan
province, was detained in July after trying to set up a group to help laidoff workers. He was sentenced in December to 10 years’ imprisonment,
accused of having “illegally provided information to overseas hostile
organizations and individuals,” reportedly for speaking about farmers’
protests in his province in a Radio Free Asia interview.45

The widely respected China Labour Bulletin, based in Hong Kong, confirms that
the process of “economic restructuring has led to huge pressures on the Chinese labour
market….many workers laid off from SOE’s have expressed dissatisfaction with the long
working hours, short-term contracts and miserly benefits that more than not await them in
the private sector.”46 Linked to this dissatisfaction is a rise in labor disputes, despite the
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frightening risk that such voicing of grievances to official bodies entails. Even the statecontrolled Labor Disputes and Arbitration Committees, however, reported a 58% increase
in cases heard in the first six months of 1999. Of course, the vast majority of such
disputes are reported only as “solved” with few details available on the facts. There are
serious procedural obstacles to bringing these disputes to these dispute resolution bodies,
so it is unknown how many on the job grievances go unreported.47 In fact, the worst
fears of critics of the PetroChina IPO and restructuring process came true in the spring of
2002 when massive demonstrations by laid off workers took place in the Daqing oilfields
owned by CNPC and PetroChina.48 These were soon followed by large protests by
unemployed workers in several parts of China, including an unusual demonstration by
workers in Beijing itself. Arrests of protest leaders such as the fathers of Yao Dan and
Xiao Yu, were paired with modest economic concessions by the regime thus ending this
particular wave of unrest.49 However, one sociologist calls these demonstrations
evidence of a “labor insurgency” underway in China.50
All of China’s industrial workers are members of the only “trade union” body
allowed to exist – the ACFTU. The ACFTU is a constituent body of the Chinese State
and thus is controlled by Communist Party cadre. As in the former Soviet Union and its
Eastern European satellites, this is a “trade union” in name only. It is, in fact, in the
Chinese regime’s own words, “a mass organization of the working class” and it serves as
a transmission belt for the party and state leadership. The Communist Party appoints all
of its officials. As the ACFTU itself stated in 1990: “the administration of union cadres
by the Party is an unchangeable principle. The ACFTU should work together with the
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in
laying down regulations concerning cadre management and in monitoring the
nomination, investigation, election, approval and allocation of union leaders.” The same
document goes on to state that
trade unions must resolutely oppose any organization or individual
expressing political views countering those of the Party…On discovering
the formation of workers’ organizations which oppose the Four Cardinal
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Principles51 and endanger the national regime, the trade union must
immediately report to same-level party committees and senior-level
unions, and must resolutely expose and dissolve them. When necessary,
the union should demand the dissolution of such organizations by the
government in accordance with the law. Concerning organizations
initiated by workers out of their specific economic interests, the union
should advise them to dissolve and terminate their activities through
persuasion and counseling.52
Thus, the ACFTU serves as the “eyes and ears” of the state inside every workplace. Far
from supporting democratic and free trade unionism, the ACFTU’s central purpose is to
carry out State and Party directives and to do everything it can to insure that all workers
fall into line as well. It is no surprise to find out, therefore, that the ACFTU is viewed by
the state as a vehicle for encouraging worker support for the very economic reform
process that is devastating the social conditions of tens of millions of workers. Those
who do not conform to the new economic order are subject to ACFTU “mobilizations.”
The Chinese political police (Public Security Bureau or “PSB”) have issued “guidelines”
that state that “the union[s] must … co-ordinate with the PSB, organize ‘public order and
prevention teams’ to protect the internal security and order of the enterprises, as well as
social order. Staff and workers should be mobilized to struggle against all forms of
criminal and illegal behavior. The union must also assist the relevant authorities to deal
adequately with the education and employment of dismissed employees, workers who
have committed errors and those have completed sentences and been released.”53 This
kind of directive can only be characterized as chilling.
Far from encouraging progressive change, as China has integrated itself into the
world economy, its approach to trade unions has remained rigidly closed. A 2001
revision to the Trade Union Law, last revised in 1992, only confirmed this. A new
version of Article 4 of the Law, for example, confirms the obligation of the ACFTU to:
“….take economic construction as the centre, adhere to the socialist road, uphold the
people’s democratic dictatorship, abide by the leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party, adhere to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping
Theory….”54 The Law also mandates that the ACFTU role in the face of a strike is to
“…assist the enterprise or institution in making proper preparations for resuming work
51
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and restoring work order as soon as possible.”55 The China Labour Bulletin concludes
that such provisions:
reaffirm…the ACFTU’s subordinate relationship to both the government
and the party at three levels: the union must abide by the Party’s guiding
principles; the union must subordinate its organization to the Party
machinery; and the union must perform the function of carrying out the
wishes of the Party in its intervention in labour disputes at local or
enterprise level.56
In addition to the dramatic human rights picture and the suppression of basic trade
union freedoms, the general situation of workers presents particular problems.
Unemployment and forced migration have already been mentioned. Further problems
include the widespread use of underemployment, short-term work, and contract labor, the
continued control of labor mobility by the State and massive violations of basic health
and safety precautions. Official statistics report nearly seven million unemployed urban
workers, but the China Labour Bulletin estimates that the total is closer to 21 million.57
And even official statistics admit to 30 million “more than needed” workers in the urban
areas. These are now supplemented by some 80 to 100 million “floating people” who
have left their villages looking for work in other areas of the country.58
Despite the need for a massive shift in employment to new entities, the State fears
that uncontrolled mobility could open the door to organized opposition to the regime.
Thus, it has largely kept in place a decades-old system of labor registration – the hukou
system.59 Under hukou every Chinese citizen is required to “have a registration with the
hukou authority or hukou police at birth.” In theory no Chinese may work or live outside
of the area where they were registered at birth. To accommodate some economic
pressures, the regime has instituted a system for providing workers with temporary
residence permits. Punishment of both employers and employees is meted out if workers
are hired without a permit.
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Nonetheless, in the face of the officially backed repression of genuine trade
unionism, workers have consistently attempted to organize independent movements
throughout the history of post 1949 Communist China.60 Far from passively accepting
the ideological claim of the regime to be a “workers state,” Chinese workers have defied
the mythology of the regime in successive waves of unrest. Interestingly, in the first few
years of Communist rule the newly established ACFTU was independent and militant –
somewhat like the trade unions in the first few years of Castro’s rule. But as in Cuba the
state soon stepped in and deposed the independent ACFTU leaders turning the
organization into a party run transmission belt organization after the classic Stalinist
model. Worker restiveness did not take long to reemerge, however, with a strike wave in
1956-57 that was apparently directly influenced by the Hungarian uprising of that same
year. Repression followed but so did periodic worker unrest, particularly during the
Cultural Revolution and in the wake of the death of Chou En lai in the 1970s. In each
case, the state cracked down. In the early 80’s the Democracy Wall movement emerged
and included specific references to Poland’s Solidarity. Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee
notes that “[t]he ascendance of the Polish Solidarity Movement emboldened Chinese
workers…to take action.”61
As economic reform under Deng gathered steam worker unrest resurfaced. The
spring 1989 movement led to the most important period of independent worker
organizing in recent years. The activists of the newly established Beijing WAF, which
sparked numerous WAF’s all over the country, initially met with some hostility from the
student demonstrators, who restricted the workers’ presence in Tiananmen to a corner of
the square.62 The China Labour Bulletin describes what happened:
As the numbers of students directly participating in the Democracy
Movement slowly began to dwindle, the WAFs became stronger. Links
between WAFs all over China were being forged and some activists
traveled to Beijing for discussions. Correspondingly the position of the
ACFTU hardened towards the WAFs and on June 2, 1989 the official
Workers Daily called for the banning of the WAFs as illegal organisations.
The call was perhaps premature. Two days later government troops fought
their way into the Square and made straight for the BWAF tents. In the
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repression that followed, thousands of workers suspected of taking part in
WAF organisations were rounded up and shot or sent to prison.63
According to Ching Kwan Lee, “in May and June 1989, workers in Beijing, Shanghai
and other cities left the confines of factory gates and their collective action took the forms
of public protests, independent unionism and political mobilization.” She notes that
workers detained in the 1989 crackdown “receiv[ed] the heaviest [prison] sentences.”64
Thus, the burgeoning workers movement was central to the dynamic of the 1989 events.
Sporadic efforts to organize independent unions and even political parties continued
through the 1990s, but with leaders almost invariably ending up in prison.
In the late 1990’s, however, widespread unrest began to reemerge among workers
responding to massive shutdowns of state industries. In many instances these companies
were being restructured with the crown jewels of what remained being appropriated by
party insiders. Most of these protests are small (a few dozen or a few hundred at most.)
But there have been some important exceptions. Chinese coal miners face some of the
most horrendous working conditions to be found in China and have been heavily
victimized by mine closures. The Labour Bulletin report noted that “[I]n 1999, the PLA
was employed to put down a three-day protest by 20,000 miners in Liaoning province
where miners were reported to have taken over a town.”65 There were also steady reports
in the same time period of other “large-scale clashes between miners and armed police
over closures and wage arrears.”66
In the spring of 2002, as suggested earlier, this unrest hit the famed Daqing oil
fields where PetroChina had begun a massive downsizing project after its IPO in 2000.67
Tens of thousands of workers took to the streets there to protest an attempt by the regime
to cut back on promised severance benefits. The role of the ACFTU in these events
demonstrates its true role. Its representatives called the Daqing oil workers protest
“illegal and unacceptable” because according to the ACFTU constitution new unions
could only be established by existing unions from above and not by workers themselves.
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It said that it had “no role to play” in the battle by these workers for their pensions
because of official instructions they had received from the Communist party committee in
the oil industry that their role was only to “understand” the situation not to advocate the
workers’ interests. In the words of the ACFTU representative in Daqing: “Under the
union system in China, the organizational relation of a union is defined by the party....the
trade union has a subordinate relationship to the Party, and a trade union must be set up
according to an organizational structure of leadership that runs from top to bottom.”
Tiananmen Square veteran union activist Han Dong Fang, issued a statement condemning
the role played by the ACFTU in the Daqing protest and urged the ACFTU to recognize
the right of the workers to organize their own union. For such efforts in the past Han
Dong Fang has been condemned at the ILO’s annual conference by China’s
representatives as a “criminal.” Ching Kwan Lee’s research confirms the “ambiguous
and conciliatory [to the employers] role played by the local ACFTU.”68 Even in the
foreign investor controlled Special Economic Zones, where some western union
advocates of a rapproachement with the ACFTU feel it could act to defend genuinely
worker interests, “[u]nion officials were…helpless in defending workers during strikes in
foreign-owned enterprises when public security personnel were often called into the
[company] compounds by management to intimidate strikers.” Indeed, she notes that the
widespread reports of high density unionization rates in the foreign enterprise sector
largely reflect “ACFTU-approved unions [that] were led and staffed by management
personnel who were mainly responsible for collecting union fees, organizing birthday
parties and recreational events. These union leaders were also salaried shop floor
supervisors or section heads in the factory administration.”69
A central theme of the state’s behavior in the current period is to try to placate
pure economic demands (over issues such as severance pay) while clamping down when
the actions move to the formation of some kind of independent workers’ organization.
Since repression of potential unrest is so crucial it is no surprise that until very recently
the head of the ACFTU, Wei Jianxing, was the same government official who as a
member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s seven member
elite Politburo had been in charge of the regime’s anti-crime “Strike Hard” campaign.
This campaign was aimed at suppressing alleged corruption and led to widespread arrests
and use of the death penalty against thousands of party officials and businessmen.70
Wei’s view on independent unions could not be more clear. He views them as “an
attempt to ‘westernize’ and ‘pluralize’ us” by “our enemies, at home and abroad” who

68

Ching Kwan Lee supra note __ at 51.

69

Id.

70

Amnesty International, China: One thousand executed in strike hard campaign against
crime, July 2, 1996 (condemning campaign as “state killing on a massive scale” and
“widespread arbitrary violation of the most basic right to life”). A revival of this
approach is underway now in China. People’s Daily, China Punishes 12,000 Criminals
Involved in Organized Crimes, March 11, 2002.

22

“seek to overturn the leadership of the Party and subvert the socialist system.”71 The
Labour Bulletin concluded its report by noting that:
Where the state has definitely not adopted a ‘soft’ approach has been when
labour organisers have attempted to take advantage of the situation and set
up labour organisations. These are rarely actually in workplaces.
Unemployment has been such a major feature of recent economic trends
that many of the angry workers involved are protesting because they have
no workplaces to go to. The case of Hunan-based independent trade
unionist Zhang Shanguang is an example of how brutal the regime can be
in dealing with labour organisers. While Zhang’s association for laid off
workers was largely apolitical, the attempt to register the organisation
legally - on the back of China’s signing of the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights - was a profoundly political act. Zhang
Shanguang was locked up for trying to organise the Shu Pu County
Association for the Rights of Laid Off Workers. Zhang has a history of
labour organising and in 1989 was sentenced for his involvement in the
Hunan Workers Autonomous Federation (HWAF). On his release, he was
blacklisted by employers and denied work. In the more recent arrest, the
police handed Zhang’s wife an official “Notice of Detention’, which stated
that Zhang was a threat to national security and was being detained under
Article 61 of the Criminal Procedures Bill. After a secret hearing lasting
two hours, he was sentenced to 10 years.72
As in most authoritarian regimes the real fear is of independent organization. A
real trade union would rob the official state labor organization of its legitimacy and thus
would open the door to deeper political change. A real trade union movement in China
could also have an important economic, as well as political, effect. Economists have
noted three major macro level imbalances in China today: limited domestic demand,
deflationary pressures and regional unevenness in the pattern of development. A trade
union movement would, through genuine adversarial bargaining, force the regime to be
more transparent and balanced in its economic decision-making. Wages would increase
thus stimulating domestic demand and price levels. This could lead to a more balanced
domestic development pattern but also weaken global tensions with countries that already
recognize trade unions. Financial analyst Richard Duncan, for example, has recently
called for the establishment of a global minimum wage for workers in export industries as
a means to restore balance to the global economy, particularly because of the impact of
71
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cheap labor in China. “Increasing wages in the developing world would augment global
aggregate demand. It would succeed in putting more money in people’s pockets,
something that traditional monetary policy is incapable of doing in [the] post-bubble
environment [the world is now experiencing.]…As consumption expanded in the newly
industrializing countries, so would demand for imported goods, an important
development that would help restore balanced trade in the world.”73 But to make this
argument about the impact of a genuine labor movement in China is to point to a postCommunist China that is no longer wed to the “race to the bottom” export-led model of
growth and that is precisely why the regime must resist in every conceivable forum such
a movement.

The International Legal Arena
This concern for the wider political and economic impact of a real trade union
movement leads to the third area of concern: the role that international legal institutions
are playing in the process. Unfortunately, rather than serve as a reminder of the
importance of balance, equity and accountability in a major socio-economic experiment
like that underway in China today, these institutions are actually pushing the regime
forward. There are many explicit examples of this process when, for example, the World
Bank provides technical advice on the downsizing and privatization of key industries.
But just as problematic are those steps taken at the WTO and the ILO which undermine
the ability of independent unions to emerge as counterweights to the muted form of shock
therapy now underway in China. The story of the granting of Permanent Normal Trade
Relations with China by the United States is relatively well known.74 In doing so, the
United States gave up one of its most important levers of influence over the progress of
labor rights and human rights in China. Less well known, however, is the groundwork
that was laid for China’s entry into the global economy at the ILO and the WTO.
One of the important achievements of the international labor rights movement
over the last decade has been its promotion of the concept of “core labor standards” that
comprise those rights seen as essential to the development of an effective trade union
movement. This campaign has given labor activists in many arenas the ability to push for
a coherent global agenda. Recognition of the core standards has now been made in a
variety of environments, though the precise content of the standards varies slightly across
institutional settings. In 1998 the ILO’s International Labour Conference, its central
body made up of all its member states together with worker and employer
representatives, issued a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The
declaration stated that there are four fundamental rights which its members had “an
obligation…to respect, to promote and to realize,” including: “freedom of association and
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms
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of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.75 Respect for
these same principles is now found in the emerging markets investment strategy of the
California Public Employees Retirement System, the world’s most important institutional
investor, and in the Generalized System of Preferences in the global trade regime.76 Even
the WTO recognized its members’ obligation to foster respect for Core Labor Standards
at its Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996.77
But there is a catch. The ILO and the WTO each carved out an exception to the
core standards that flatly contradicts the central principle of international labor solidarity
that has guided the international labor rights movement since the founding of the ILO in
1919. Paragraph 5 of the ILO’s Fundamental Declaration states that:
The International Labour Conference…Stresses that labour standards
Should not be used for protectionist trade purposes, and that nothing in
this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for
such purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any country
should in no way be called into question by this Declaration and its
follow-up.
But labor standards are promulgated precisely because they are protectionist: protective
of the relatively advanced conditions won by workers in economies with established trade
unions. Many of these protections were won only after bitter battle with employers and
governments alike. Thus, the Preamble to the ILO’s Constitution, drafted at the ILO’s
opening conference in 1919, states that “the failure of any nation to adopt humane
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve
the conditions in their own countries.”78 This concept of labor standards as a protective
75
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floor beneath which the world should not fall was reaffirmed at the Philadelphia
Convention that restarted the ILO in the post World War II world. Thus, it was precisely
the need to avoid the allegedly non-existent “race to the bottom” in global labor standards
that explains the very origin of the ILO.
As former National Labor Relations Board Chair William B. Gould IV has
pointed out this principle of international labor solidarity has a firm basis in domestic
U.S. law.
The idea of unfair competition….is also reflected in portions of the
National Labor Relations Act’s own preamble, enacted to promote
freedom of association and collective bargaining in the Untied States
shortly after the United States joined the ILO….Interestingly, in enacting
the NLRA, Congress announced that a primary purpose of this policy was
to remove the downward pressure on wages that a failure to protect
collective bargaining produces.79
It was no surprise, therefore, that the proposed carve-out language that aimed to protect
the cheap labor export model of growth found in developing countries was the cause of
bitter debate in the ILO during its 1998 Conference. The United States representative
(from the Clinton Administration) and the delegates representing the trade union
movement bitterly opposed the language, while many developing countries including
China pushed hard for it. If the leading United Nations agency responsible for promoting
global labor standards was unable, or unwilling, to stand up to the pressures of
globalization - tossing aside an 80-year old core principle in favor of cheap labor and the
return of sweatshops - is it any surprise that the international labor movement finds itself
in such a challenging position?
As if to add insult to injury, in the summer of 2002, the ILO elevated the
representative of China’s ACFTU to an alternate seat on the ILO’s Governing Body.80
Apparently some ILO delegates attempted to justify the vote, which meant that Israel’s
Histadrut would lose its seat, as a fair protest of Ariel Sharon’s policies towards the
Palestinian people. The China Labour Bulletin called this a “ploy” and stated that those
who fell for it “are guilty of confusion, at best, and [of] a serious lack of principle at
worst.” Unfortunately, this move seemed to echo the attempt of some in the international
labor movement who have advocated a process of “constructive engagement” with the
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ACFTU.81 An argument that these same activists dismissed with derision in the antiapartheid movement is now welcomed despite the lack of any evidence that such
“engagement” helps Chinese workers. The China Labour Bulletin condemns this
approach as “the creeping legitimation” of the ACFTU.

Global Labor’s Approach to China
As might be expected, the international labor movement has largely been very
supportive of efforts to establish genuine, independent trade unions in China. The
ICFTU has been a strong supporter of workers’ rights in China, backing efforts to bring
charges against the regime for violation of such rights at bodies like the ILO and
providing resources to groups like the China Labour Bulletin and the Global Unions
Liaison Office, both in Hong Kong.82 While the ICFTU’s official “China Policy”
statement of November 2002 recognizes that there are different views on how to
approach China within the international labor movement, it notes that “China violates
human, religious and workers rights on a massive scale, including the central enabling
rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining.”83 Further, in the face of these
differences, the ICFTU concluded that the ACFTU “is not an independent trade union
organization and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an authentic voice of Chinese
workers.” It thus “reaffirm[ed] its request to all affiliates and Global Union Federations
having contact with the Chinese authorities, including the ACFTU, to engage in critical
dialogue…include[ing] raising violations of fundamental workers’ and trade union rights
in any such meetings, especially concerning detentions of trade union and labour rights
activists.”84 Such a position of “critical” dialogue appears to lie somewhere in the middle
of the range of relationships now found within international labor, which include
everything from “no contacts” to “constructive dialogue.” The ICFTU defines “critical”
dialogue as including “raising violations of fundamental workers’ and trade union rights
in any such meetings, especially concerning detention of trade union and labour rights
activists.”85
Somewhat surprisingly, however, some within the American labor movement,
where a “no contacts” viewpoint has largely driven labor policy towards China, are now
making an argument for a so-called constructive dialogue with the ACFTU that is
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precisely the kind of effort that so concerns the China Labour Bulletin about the possible
“creeping legitimation” of that state body. Kent Wong, an American labor lawyer and
former official of the Service Employees International Union and currently director of the
UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education, Elaine Bernard, Executive Director of
the Harvard University Trade Union Program and Gregory Mantsios of the Worker
Education Center at Queen’s College of the City University of New York, have all
recently advocated that the AFL-CIO should recognize the ACFTU.86
In the spring of 2002, Mantsios led a trip of US academics and labor educators to
China to meet with the ACFTU. He later issued a report calling for its recognition.87
Despite the evidence presented consistently over the last decade by Han Dong Fang and
other human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
Mantsios argued that the “ACFTU is an important advocate on behalf of [Chinese]
workers.”88 A review of the report indicates that this delegation may have violated the
ICFTU’s official policy of critical dialogue with the ACFTU if and when such contact
does take place, though admittedly that policy was only put in place after this particular
trip. The Mantsios trip was undertaken “at the invitation” of the ACFTU and the
delegation was “escorted throughout [their] trip” by the Deputy Head of the ACFTU’s
international department.89 Thus, there should be some initial concern that the
information presented to the delegation was filtered to favor the Chinese government and
that delegation members were not free to engage in an open dialogue with any Chinese
workers they may have encountered. Indeed, Mantsios admits that “[b]ecause the
delegation was visiting China at the invitation of the ACFTU, we did not meet with
independent trade unionists, nor did we request to do so.” The delegation “tried to
compensate” for this deficit “by reviewing material written by independent activists.” Of
course, such material is widely available from organizations like the China Labour
Bulletin, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and would hardly justify a trip
to China.
Clearly the delegation had another goal. As Mantsios reports, “our purpose…was
twofold: 1) to improve mutual understanding of our respective labor movements, and 2)
to explore ways in which relations between the Chinese and U.S. labor unions could be
improved.” Thus, from the outset, before the delegation even left the United States, it
had already concluded that the ACFTU constitutes a genuine labor movement. The trip,
then, had a political goal not a research or legitimate educational aim, despite having
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been organized by the university-based director of a worker education program and
including in the delegation Kent Wong of UCLA, Elaine Bernard of Harvard, and Ruth
Milkman, a UCLA sociology professor and Director of the newly established Institute of
Labor and Employment at the University of California.
The Mantsios Report ignores, sidesteps or outright contradicts what is widely
known about the status of worker rights and the role of the ACFTU in China today. At
one point, for example, it states that “China’s international agreements as well as its
domestic labor and trade union laws provide important rights and protections. Workers
in China have the right to join a union, to elect and remove union leaders democratically,
and to strike against an employer.”90 The only source for these almost laughable
conclusions is a reference to the recent ratification by China of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and a note that “other union rights are
embedded in China’s Trade Union Law, revised in 2001.”91 What do these laws actually
indicate? Since the ACFTU exists to defend the interests of the state it cannot, of course,
be called a genuine trade union and that is the conclusion reached by the ICFTU in its
China Policy Statement promulgated in late 2002. Since by law, the ACFTU enjoys a
legal monopoly92 there are no legally protected union alternatives for Chinese workers.
Efforts to form alternatives to the ACFTU have been met consistently with the full force
of state power. The Trade Union Law instead of protecting the freedom of association
establishes a strict organizational hierarchy which requires each level of union
organization in the country to submit to the will of the next higher level of organization,
culminating in the ACFTU “which shall be established as the unified national
organization.”93 In fact, all of the bodies in the Chinese trade union movement are
mandated to follow “the principle of democratic centralism,” a hallmark of undemocratic
Stalinist regimes.94 While the Law states that worker assemblies “shall have the right to
remove or recall”95 union representatives, the “trade union organization at a higher level
shall exercise leadership over a trade union organization at a lower level.”96 Further, new
local unions can only be established with the “approval” of “the trade union organization
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at the next higher level.”97 Finally, union financial resources are controlled jointly by
the ACFTU and the Chinese state.98 Thus, the China Labour Bulletin concluded that
“[i]ndependent trade unionists in China will find nothing to celebrate in [the new]
legislation that guarantees the finances of an official trade union with a legal monopoly
on organising.”99
The Trade Union Law does not contain any mention of the right to strike and the
explicit affirmation of this right once found in the Chinese constitution was deleted in
1982. As the ICFTU concluded in its 2003 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union
Rights, “the right to strike was removed from China’s Constitution in 1982 on the
grounds that the political system in place had ‘eradicated problems between the
proletariat and enterprise owners.’”100 In fact, according to one leading scholar of the
Chinese labor movement, the elimination of the right to strike was a reaction by the
regime to a wildcat strike wave that hit China in the wake of the emergence of Polish
Solidarity in 1980 and 1981.101 Instead, China’s Labour Law only provides that “where a
labour dispute…takes place, the parties concerned may apply for mediation or arbitration
or take legal proceedings according to law, or may seek for a settlement through
arbitration.”102
It is true that the ICESCR does recognize both the the right of individuals “to
form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice…[and] the right to strike.”103
China ratified the ICESCR in 2001. However, the right to strike in the ICESCR is
limited by a proviso which states that the right exists “provided that it is exercised in
conformity with the laws of the particular country.” Given the severe constraint on the
right to strike in China in law and practice it seems unlikely that any worker can hope to
take refuge in the ICESCR. Even if one could read the ICESCR to override the absence
of the right to strike inside China, it is not a self-executing agreement and thus does not
automatically become law inside China upon ratification but explicitly requires China “to
take steps… including particularly the adoption of legislative measures…with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
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Covenant.” 104 Far from taking such steps, China appears to have moved away from its
apparent commitment to genuine trade union freedom. The sweeping conclusion by
Mantsios that the right to strike actually exists in China by virtue of the ICESCR and the
Trade Union Law is thus unwarranted. Further, upon joining the ICESCR, China issued
a specific reservation, as it is allowed to do under international law, that “the application
of Article 8.1 (a) [the right of workers to form trade unions and join unions of their own
choice] of the Covenant to the People's Republic of China shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Trade Union
Law of the People's Republic of China and Labor Law of the People's Republic of
China.” Thus, the monopoly of the ACFTU has been explicitly preserved.
In the fall of 2002, following the release of the Mantsios Report, UCLA’s Kent
Wong led a trip to China also, bringing with him, among others, Andy Stern, the
President of the Service Employees International Union, and Tom Rankin, President of
the California Labor Federation. This group met only with ACFTU representatives not
with independent union activists. A report on the visit appeared in the South China
Morning Post in which Kent Wong called for a “dialogue” with the ACFTU and argued
that “reopening lines of communication” would “better serve the interests of US
companies” investing in China.105 These statements received a quick and sharp rebuke
from Barbara Shailor, the director of the AFL-CIO’s Department of International Affairs,
who wrote a letter to the editor of the Post stating that the Wong-led group was not an
official AFL-CIO delegation and that the AFL-CIO shares the official view of the
international labor movement that “the ACFTU is not an independent trade union but
rather part of the Chinese government and party structure.”106
The viewpoint of Wong, Bernard and Mantsios has yet to gain wider traction in
the American labor movement but it is symbolic of the intellectual problem that the
current situation poses. A detailed analysis of the pitfalls of “constructive engagement”
by organized labor with authoritarian regimes was undertaken by the International Union
of Foodworkers, the official international body representing union organizations in the
food industry, in 1997. An IUF Mission to Hong Kong and China, which did meet with
many independent Chinese unionists reached very different conclusions than these
individuals. Consistent with the analysis presented here, which indeed relies in part on
the work of the IUF Mission, the IUF reached several important and still relevant
conclusions:
1) “the ACFTU remains a subordinate organisation under tight party
control, with no autonomy whatsoever….[thus a] dialogue between the
104

Art. 2, ICESCR.

105

Leigh Jenkins, US Unions resume talks after 20 years, South China Morning Post,
Sept. 27, 2002.

106

Barbara Shailor, Letter to the Editor, South China Morning Post, n.d. (copy in
possession of the author).

31

ICFTU (or any other democratic trade union organization, also at national
level) and the ACFTU is not a dialogue between two trade union
organisations but between a trade union organisation on the one hand and
a state organization on the other”107;
2) “All informed observers concur that there is no possibility of the
ACFTU evolving into an independent organisation by itself….there would
have to be serious division in the party and the emergence of a strong
reformist-progressive tendency prevailing over the party conservatives…it
is certainly not visiting foreign trade unionists who will influence the
outcome of such political struggles”108;
3) “The China issue is too important and it [is] too complex to be handled
by persons unprepared for the task. Participants in delegations have to
take the time to be briefed in depth….Chinese democratic trade unionists
[including the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and Han
Dongfang of the China Labour Bulletin] as well as NGOs with specific
relevant expertise, should be involved in preparing any dialogue and in the
discussions themselves”;109 and
4) “Full support, politically and financially, should be extended to Han
Dongfang and other Chinese democratic trade unionists, by the ICFTU,
ITSs and national trade union organisations in a position to do so”.110
Unfortunately, these core conclusions of a major international labor body appear
to have been either readily ignored or violated by both the Mantsios and Wong
delegations. In light of the vigorous efforts of many thousands, if not millions, of
Chinese workers such as Xiao Yunliang and Yao Fuxin to express their basic human
rights to freedom of speech and association, it seems tragic that those in a position most
capable of providing them support and encouragement at this crucial turning point in
Chinese history willfully ignore them and, instead, present a distorted picture of Chinese
reality to the outside world. An alternative view must be articulated if Chinese and
western workers are to join together to reverse the “race to the bottom.”
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